Thus Sarah is a sibling and Jack is not, though neither is a brother. To avoid substance dualism, we simply need to conjoin a supervenience thesis with some constraint on the composition of mental items. A good deal of philosophical work has gone into distinguishing these forms of supervenience, and into examining their pairwise logical relations.
It is also obvious why A-properties supervene on A-properties. This however is paradoxicalbased on the fact that physicalism both permits and prevents the existence of such beings. The upshot is that the logical supervenience of property set A on property set B will only guarantee that each A-property is entailed by some B-property if A and B are closed under both infinitary Boolean operations and property-forming operations involving quantification.
Paull, C. Unlike Morgan, Hare used the term in essentially the current philosophical sense, but he claims that he was not the first to do so. Also, note that in the early literature properties were not always central, and there remain some who prefer to frame the relation in terms of predicatesfactsor entities instead, for example.
The physical facts clearly do not logically necessitate the mental facts. The kind of modal force can vary; different supervenience claims might attribute different kinds of necessity to the connection between B-properties and A-properties see Section 3. But this is not a trivial assumption, for two reasons.
At heart, all a supervenience claim says is that A-properties covary with B-properties. But it occasionally is, and when it is, it typically has a different meaning. RosenAudiand ontological dependence seems to obtain between members of a variety of ontological categories.